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THE FEDERALIST PROVENANCE OF THE  
PRINCIPLE OF PRIVACY 
ELVIN T. LIM∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 The right to privacy is the centerpiece of modern liberal consti-
tutional thought in the United States.  But liberals rarely invoke 
“the Founding” to justify this right, as if conceding that the right 
to privacy was somehow a radical departure from “original 
meaning,” perhaps pulled out of the hat by “activist” judges tak-
ing great interpretive liberties with the constitutional text.  Far 
from being an unorthodox and modern invention, I argue here 
that privacy is a principle grounded in the very architecture of 
the Constitution as enumerated in its Articles, perhaps even more 
so than in particular sections of the Bill of Rights, as is currently 
understood.  More specifically, modern liberalism’s articulation 
of the right to privacy in the twentieth century against state legis-
lative leviathans bears a family resemblance to three principles in 
the Federalists’ political theory, which introduced the new feder-
alism, the new liberalism, and the new republicanism, which in 
turn are embedded in three interrelated structural innovations 
that would presage the modern turn to privacy: (1) the establish-
ment of a stronger union would nationalize rights and introduce 
the radical idea that the federal government was not antithetical 
to liberty but would better guarantee it (the new federalism); (2) 
the creation of a large republic would acknowledge that fellow 
citizens, even more so than kings, can threaten our liberties (the 
new liberalism); and finally, (3) the introduction of the separa-
tion of powers would reverse the classical commitment to homo-
geneity and affirm instead the virtue of heterogeneity in under-
standing and constituting the republican commonweal (the new 
republicanism). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
One would have thought that the most liberal of liberal nations, one 
forged out of revolution against monarchy at the height of the Enlighten-
ment, would have explicitly taken some notion of privacy, the right “to be 
let alone,” and placed it front and center in its Constitution as a permanent 
bulwark against totalitarian government.1  But this was not the path the 
framers took.  Privacy does not explicitly appear in the Articles of the Con-
stitution, and even when it does appear in the (Fourth and Fifth) Amend-
ments, it would seem that the framers were concerned with informational 
rather than decisional privacy—arguably, just what modern privacy advo-
cates hold most dear.  This seeming silence lends some credence to the 
claim that modern notions of decisional privacy were pulled out of the hat 
by “activist” judges in the second half of the twentieth century and have lit-
tle to do with “founding” views.  I will argue in this Paper that this is an er-
roneous, Anti-Federalized view of the American “founding.”   
In introducing a new federalism, a new liberalism, and a new republi-
canism, Publius was a trailblazer for our modern notions of decisional pri-
vacy.  If he did not call privacy by its name, it is because these three princi-
ples were artfully embedded in three architectural innovations created in the 
Constitution: a stronger union, a large republic, and a system of separated 
powers.  Each of these architectural innovations served to push the states, 
the foundational units of the Confederation from 1776 to 1787, into the 
background, and only then allowed the individual to merge into the fore-
ground of the new Union.  Though arguably tentative, the turn to the “pri-
vate as self” of our time was at least prefigured in these eighteenth-century 
innovations.2 
II.  THE LEGACY OF THE FIRST FOUNDING 
It was a radical project.  As Rome was not built in a day, the Federal-
ists’ vision of “a more perfect Union” took time to unfold because it chafed 
greatly against a very different union that already existed before the Feder-
alists came onto the scene.  For the United States has had not one, but two 
Foundings.3  In the beginning were the states, tied in a “league of friend-
ship,” under the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.4  This was 
what I have called the First Founding, which established the old federalism 
that the Anti-Federalists defended in 1787 and 1788.  Behind state lines, 
                                                          
 1.  The phrase is taken from Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890). 
 2.  Joe Bailey, From Public to Private: The Development of the Concept of the “Private,” 
69 SOC. RES. 15, 23 (2002). 
 3.  ELVIN T. LIM, THE LOVERS’ QUARREL (2014). 
 4.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III, para. 1. 
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these mostly old-school classical republicans presumed that virtuous indi-
viduals would, or at least ought to, subvert their private interests for the 
common good.5  As long as the states remained the preeminent and founda-
tional units of the union as then conceived, and as long as Americans were 
persuaded that that individual liberty was best protected by, and therefore 
subordinated to, the state legislatures, the individual could not see the light 
of day.  Indeed, the First Founding explains the resistance to Publius’ na-
tionalizing project, in response to which he was compelled to honor the leg-
acy of state sovereignty in the composition of the Senate, in the electoral 
college, in Article Five, in the Bill of Rights, and most unequivocally, in the 
Tenth Amendment. All of this the Federalists had to concede even though it 
was because of the failure of coordination between the states that the dele-
gates had come to Philadelphia.  The problem (for the Federalists) had to 
become (for the Anti-Federalists) part of the solution.  So it is one of the 
grand ironies of the Second Founding of 1787–1788 that while the Federal-
ists won the immediate battle of ratification for a stronger union, they might 
have lost the on-going ground war over the scope and extent of states’ 
rights, at least until the Civil War and possibly beyond. 
States’ sovereignty (or later, rights) was the paramount principle of 
1776.  The text of the Declaration of Independence, after all, begins with 
“The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America.”6  
This was our First Founding, and the Declaration of Independence (and to a 
lesser extent the Articles of Confederation, and later, the Bill of Rights) was 
its sacred text(s).  While much attention has been devoted to the line, “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” wherefrom the case might be made 
that the Revolution was inspired by liberalism and the commitment to natu-
ral and/or individual rights, the overwhelming majority of the rest of the 
text suggests that the Revolutionaries were classical republicans fighting 
fiercely to separate their communities from the Crown.7  The Revolution did 
not involve a sea of individuals revolting from George III, and it certainly 
did not return an unconstituted mob of women and men to the state of na-
ture.  Rather, even in the act of severance was the not-so-implicit act of 
constitution: “the Representatives of the united States of America . . . sol-
emnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right 
ought to be Free and Independent States.”8  The First Founding created thir-
teen sovereign states, and it was simply assumed that it was under the aus-
pices of these states that individual “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
                                                          
 5.  GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 53 (1969). 
 6.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (noting the capitalization 
States in original and lack of capaitalization of the word “united”). 
 7.  For this opposing view, see MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW 
REPUBLICANISM (1994).  
 8.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
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ness” was best secured.  There was little room for modern notions of deci-
sional privacy in this classically republican vision of a community of com-
munities. 
Only this would explain, as Gordon Wood observed, how the “celebra-
tion of the public welfare and the safety of the people . . . justified the very 
severe restrictions put on private interests and rights throughout the Revolu-
tionary crisis.”9  Modern anti-privacy advocates inherited their constitution-
al worldview from the First Founding, not the Second.  Insofar as they 
thought individual liberty and the public good were reconcilable, it was be-
cause the Revolutionaries, and later the Anti-Federalists, prioritized politi-
cal liberty over social equality.10  For them, the most important political 
rights were collective rather than individual.  The First Founders and the 
Anti-Federalists understood that individual liberties could only be possible 
and entertained after collective political liberties—what was then common-
ly known as the “rights of Englishmen”—were secured.  “This is why,” as 
Wood observed, “throughout the eighteenth century the Americans could 
contend for the broadest freedom of speech against the magistracy, while at 
the same time punishing with a severe strictness any seditious libels against 
the representatives of the people in the colonial assemblies.”11  This seem-
ingly paradoxical attitude toward individual rights persisted deep into the 
nineteenth century in the political thought of neo-Anti-Federalism (mostly 
within the Democratic Party), for as long as the Bill of Rights was under-
stood as a bill of states’ rights claimed against the federal government and 
probably even beyond its “incorporation.”12  History matters, and it gave 
the defenders of the status quo in 1787, and their intellectual descendants in 
the centuries to come, a big home field advantage. 
If, when jurists and scholars refer to the “founding,” they mean the 
Revolution and what I call the First Founding, then they would be on very 
secure ground if they were to dismiss the twentieth-century turn to the indi-
vidual and privacy as perversions of the spirit of ‘76.  But the First Found-
ing was not the Second Founding, when the Federalists mounted a revolu-
tion not against, but in favor of government and a national community.13  
That there was not one set of “founders” but two makes all the difference in 
terms of establishing the constitutional pedigree of the right to privacy, and 
we should not conflate the Federalists’ innovations for the Anti-Federalists’ 
reservations.  Perhaps there is no need to look to the Bill of Rights—
                                                          
 9.  WOOD, supra note 5, at 63. 
 10.  And this may be a reason to privilege the interpretation of the Second Amendment as a 
collective rather than an individual right. 
 11.  WOOD, supra note 5, at 63. 
 12. Gary Gerstle, The Resilient Power of the States Across the Long Nineteenth Century, in 
THE UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATE (Lawrence Jacobs & Desmond King eds., 2009). 
 13.  MAX M. ELDING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVENRMENT (2003).  
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something Alexander Hamilton argued against in Federalist 8414—for pri-
vacy’s textual hook.  Indeed, in looking for the right to privacy in the Bill, 
Progressive Era and modern liberal jurists and scholars may have been 
looking in the wrong place; perhaps even conceding too quickly that the 
original Constitution of 1787, sans Civil War Amendments, had no room 
for privacy, thereby ceding the constitutional high ground to defenders of 
“original meaning” who argue that privacy was an unorthodox invention of 
the twentieth century.  The reverse is closer to the truth.  Privacy advocates 
need not point to “penumbras” or “emanations”; the principles that animate 
privacy are not only there in the text of the Constitution, but are embedded 
in three interrelated features of its architecture: a stronger union and central 
government, the large republic, and the separation of powers.  Modern lib-
erals championing the right to privacy need not fear “textualists,” for they 
are arguably more original than the “originalists”—they are architecturalists 
averring the deep meaning of the Second Founding. 
III.  THE NEW (CENTRALIZED) FEDERALISM, NEW (HORIZONTALIST) 
LIBERALISM, AND NEW (HETEROGENIZED) REPUBLICANISM 
Scholars have long noticed one clear pattern that connects the most 
famous cases involving decisional privacy: they have overwhelmingly in-
volved sexual privacy.15  But there is another, perhaps, more fundamental 
and uniquely American point of commonality.  Of all the many different 
ways American jurists could have come to understand privacy as a constitu-
tional principle—it might have been, for example, conceived as a doctrine 
protecting households from state statutes, or political communities against 
the federal government, or corporations (the economic) against the state or 
federal governments (the political)—they have, in landmark cases, over-
whelmingly chosen to think of it as a constitutional right wielded by indi-
viduals protecting them against morally invasive state statutes.  These cases 
have all intersected with the major fault line of American politics: the con-
tested boundary between federal powers and states’ rights, which is exactly 
what the battle between the First and Second Foundings was about. 
Here is the canonical case history.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting “any drug, 
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception.”16  
In Roe v. Wade, the Court, transitioning from the “penumbras” of the Bill of 
Rights as the basis of privacy to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, decided that a Texas law criminalizing abortion was unconsti-
                                                          
 14.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 15.  See text accompanying infra notes 16–22.  But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494 (1977), and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), 
for exceptions to this pattern. 
 16.  381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). 
 420 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:415 
tutional.17  Subsequently, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird struck down a 
Massachusetts law and extended the right to possess contraception to un-
married couples.18  Thirty years later, another Texas law criminalizing sod-
omy was declared unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas.19  In each of these 
landmark cases, the Court had to determine if Connecticut, Texas, or Mas-
sachusetts could demonstrate a legitimate state interest in regulating the use 
of contraception, abortion, and sexual intimacy.20  So Jed Rubenfeld was on 
point when he argued that privacy protects us from “a society standardized 
and normalized, in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly directed.  
That is the threat posed by state power in our century.”21  He might have 
appended an important footnote to explain what he meant by “state power” 
because the Court has overwhelmingly perceived the threat of totalitarian-
ism, at least from Griswold to Lawrence, from the state legislatures, and not 
the federal government. 
Tellingly, in each of the above landmark cases, the dissenting Justices 
crying foul invoked some version of the states’ rights argument, exactly 
what their intellectual forebears, the Anti-Federalists, did in 1787 to 1788.22  
                                                          
 17.  410 U.S. 113 (1973).  Although Justice William O. Douglas, in his concurring opinion, 
also turned to the Bill of Rights to argue that the constitutional right to privacy was based on the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.  Id. at 167 (“For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Douglas, see post, p. 209.”); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209–15 (1973) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). 
 18.  405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 19.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 20.  There are, of course, informational privacy cases invoking the right against the federal 
government, but I do not discuss them here because no one denies the textual basis for them. 
 21.  Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989). 
 22.  In his dissent to Griswold, Justice Stewart wrote: 
Until today, no member of this Court has ever suggested that the Ninth Amendment 
meant anything else, and the idea that a federal court could ever use the Ninth Amend-
ment to annul a law passed by the elected representatives of the people of the State of 
Connecticut would have caused James Madison no little wonder. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965).  In his dissent to Roe, Justice Rehnquist 
wrote: 
The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those 
States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication, it 
seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not ‘so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 175 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).  In his dissent 
to Eisenstadt, Justice Burger wrote, “My disagreement with the opinion of the Court and that of 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE goes far beyond mere puzzlement, however, for these opinions seriously 
invade the constitutional prerogatives of the States, and regrettably hark back to the heyday of 
substantive due process.”  Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 467.  In his dissent to Lawrence, Justice Scalia 
wrote: 
 
[P]ersuading one’s fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one’s views in absence of 
democratic majority will is something else.  I would no more require a State to crimi-
nalize homosexual acts—or, for that matter, display any moral disapprobation of 
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Their protest is more than coincidental.  After all, the Bill of Rights, a char-
ter appended to the Constitution at the demand of the Anti-Federalists, had 
been intended to protect states’ rights in the eighteenth century and was 
never intended to accomplish the reverse in the twentieth.  The Bill began, 
of course, with an emphatically negative injunction that “Congress shall 
make no law . . .” and concluded with a positive and capacious affirmation 
of states’ rights: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people.”  The Bill was an Anti-Federalist reservation, 
not a Federalist innovation. 
In what follows, I will argue that the Federalists’ architectonic act of 
the Second Founding, alongside the principles they adduced in defense of it, 
as laid out in Table 1, anticipated our modern turn to privacy in three fun-
damental and mutually reinforcing ways.  First, the Federalists advocated a 
stronger union and a stronger central government with more robust powers 
to rein in the centrifugalizing tendencies of the state legislatures and to pro-
tect individual liberties.  We might call this the new, centralized federalism.  
Second, the Federalists understood that with the King gone, the threat to 
liberty for a republican citizenry no longer came from on high, but also hor-
izontally, from our friends on the side.  Liberty meant more than freedom 
from the King, it also meant freedom from oppressive majorities—our fel-
low citizens.  The large republic was an institutional solution designed to 
resolve this problem.  We might call this the new, horizontalist liberalism.  
Third, when the Federalists envisioned a large republic, in order to limit the 
perils of this newfound state of affairs, they had to embrace heterogeneity—
a given condition in large republics—when before homogeneity was under-
stood to be the necessary pre-condition for republicanism.  They institution-
alized this heterogeneity in the large republic as well as in the separation of 
powers.  We might call this the new, heterogenized republicanism.  The 
Second Founding’s reconceptualization of federalism, liberalism, and re-
publicanism had far-reaching consequences that reverberate in our own day.  
In particular, the new federalism’s prioritization of the federal Constitution 
and the national majority as opposed to the state constitutions as the superi-
or guarantor of individual liberty, the new liberalism’s anticipation that our 
fellow citizens can threaten our liberty, and the new republicanism’s reval-
orization of heterogeneity from an ancient vice into a modern virtue are all 
entirely in sync with, if not the progenitors of, the modern right to privacy.  
I elaborate on all three fronts below. 
  
                                                          
them—than I would forbid it to do so.  What Texas has chosen to do is well within the 
range of traditional democratic action. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 603. 
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Table 1: The Old v. the New and Federalism, Liberalism, and Republicanism 
 
 Anti-Federalist 
(Defenders of the First Founding) 
Federalist 
(Second Founders) 
 Architectural 
(Old) 
Ideational 
(Old) 
Architectural 
(New) 
Ideational 
(New) 
Federalism League of 
Nations (small 
republics) 
Peripheralized 
Federalism 
Nation Centralized 
Federalism 
Liberalism (League of) 
small republics 
Verticalist 
liberalism 
(Freedom from 
kings) 
Large republic Horizontalist 
liberalism 
(Freedom from the 
effects of faction) 
Republicanism Legislative 
Sovereignty 
 
Homogenous 
republicanism 
Separation of 
Powers 
 
Heterogenized 
republicanism 
A.  The New, Centralized Federalism 
Modern privacy advocates believe that all Americans have certain de-
cisional freedoms, and these freedoms do not depend on which state we live 
in.  These rights are nationalized.  Privacy advocates believe that states 
should not be allowed to legislate on intimate matters of personal choice in 
such a way that contravenes the nation’s highest law, and if need be, the 
federal government should be empowered to enforce this.  None of this 
would have been possible had the Federalists not centralized federalism. 
Publius did not assume that the state legislatures knew what was best 
for their citizens; indeed, many Federalists saw them as potential road-
blocks to liberty, which is why they pivoted in favor of a stronger union and 
central government.  Madison et al. believed that a movement from a com-
munity of communities in the direction of a national community—one that 
became a community of individuals—was necessary to rein in the mischief 
of the state legislatures.  For if the states were once the foundational units of 
the Confederation, the Federalists had to find a new and equally legitimate 
foundational unit for the Union, one that could justify the (partial) transfer 
of sovereignty from the state governments to the new federal government.  
The individual had to come into the foreground when the First Founding’s 
community of communities gave way to the Second Founding’s community 
of individuals. 
“And happily for the republican cause,” Madison submitted in Feder-
alist 51, “the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a 
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judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.”23  Continuing 
with perhaps the most famous move in the Federalist Papers, he suggested, 
“Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; 
you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”24  The idea of “a majority of 
the whole” was, of course, a fundamental departure from how the First 
Founders understood their political community—as little more than, as the 
Articles of Confederation put it, “a league of friendship” among sovereign 
states, not unlike the European Union today.25  In linking the fate of the in-
dividual with the nation in the argument that minority rights were better 
protected in a large than in a small republic, Publius was deftly nationaliz-
ing rights at the same time that he was centralizing federalism. 
The creation of “a more perfect Union” was a watershed moment for 
the idea of federalism, which had always referred to peripheralized federal-
ism up until the Federalist intervention.26  As was the understanding under 
the arrangement under the Articles of Confederation, each republic was 
sovereign and legitimate in its own right; no one republic was a creature of 
the union of which it was a part, because each republic, as indicated in the 
rule of unanimity in Article 13 of the old constitution, retained a veto on 
any proposed amendment to the constitution.27  To audaciously suggest that 
a Union could be made “more perfect,” as the Federalists did, was to turn 
the word “union” from a description of a relationship between republics in-
to an entity in its own right (though arguably this transformation would be 
completed only after the Civil War).  This is what Madison meant when he 
so deftly characterized the new republic the Federalists were creating as 
“partly federal and partly national.”28  While tipping the hat to the First 
Founding in various parts of the Constitution, such as in the Bill of Rights, 
in effect, the Second Founding was inaugurating a very different kind of un-
ion.  Between 1776 and 1789, a league of nations would become a nation.  
This major architectural flip underneath the surface nomenclatural continui-
ty (“federalism”) explains some of the most vociferous debates about the 
meaning of federalism in American history, from the Nullification Crisis of 
the 1830s to the Civil War.  The debate continues today in our deliberations 
about privacy because when we say “federalism” we do not mean the same 
thing.  Just as the Federalists extoled the merits of a more centralized feder-
alism to the Anti-Federalists in the late 1780s, the privacy cases of the 
twentieth century might be fairly described as representing a neo-Federalist 
                                                          
 23.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. III, para. 1. 
 26.  For the distinction between “peripheralized” and “centralized” federalism, see WILLIAM 
RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 5–8 (1964). 
 27.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII, para. 1. 
 28.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
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arc underway, when privacy’s ascension coincided with a new impatience 
with the myopic tendency of state governments.29  In this very important 
regard, the plaintiffs in Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence were on the same 
page as Publius. 
The Second Founders were persuaded that the state legislative levia-
thans that had sprouted in the post-Revolutionary period were the cause of 
majority tyranny in the states on the one hand, and collective inaction 
across the Confederation on the other.  If the First Founders erred on the as-
sumption that the states could do no wrong, the Second Founders erred on 
the assumption that the states could do a lot of wrong (and the federal gov-
ernment, not quite as much as its detractors claimed).  Far from being a 
devotee of the old, peripheralized federalism, the arch-nationalist Alexander 
Hamilton, in Federalist 84, even argued against the need for a Bill of 
Rights, because, among other reasons, he probably understood the bite of 
the Tenth Amendment.30  In rejecting the need for a Bill of Rights in Feder-
alist 84, Hamilton warned of the danger of trying to (and inevitably failing 
to) codify the infinite rights of the people; but he was also turning the Anti-
Federalist understanding of rights on its head, saying, “The truth is, after all 
the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every ra-
tional sense, and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights.”31  And that was 
why there was no need, in his mind, for pessimistic elaborations of the kind 
the Anti-Federalists wanted.  The “rights of the citizens . . . are to be found 
in any part of the instrument which establishes the government,” Hamilton 
proudly proclaimed.32 
This was a spectacularly modern argument, one that proposed that a 
thesis encapsulated its antithesis, and one that we often associate with 
Abraham Lincoln and the Reconstructors; yet Hamilton had made it first.  
In synthesizing powers and rights, Hamilton made it clear that he was on 
the side of the former; more importantly, he was conjoining the fate of citi-
zens with the federal government itself.  The Federalists, unlike the Anti-
Federalists and their descendants, did not think of the Constitution as a neg-
ative charter restraining government to protect individual liberties, but as a 
positive charter creating government in order to protect individual liberty.  
To nationalize liberty in this manner—untethering the individual from the 
states—was also to individualize our rights.  We see here also that Hamilton 
was more than a textualist; he was an architecturalist.  Rights are to be 
found in “any part of the instrument which establishes the government.”33  
For him, the rights of citizens, the Constitution, and the government it es-
                                                          
 29.  Cf. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).  
 30.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 33.  Id. 
 2015] THE PRINCIPLE OF PRIVACY 425 
tablished cohere in a single, complex gestalt.  So it is something of a meta-
historical irony, then, that privacy advocates have turned to the Bill of 
Rights—the second(ary) and not the first part of the Constitution that Ham-
ilton had argued was unnecessary—to promote the very claims that the 
Second Founders had first advanced.  They might have taken Hamilton’s 
advice to look to the first half of the “instrument.”  As its very clausal chro-
nology indicates, the Constitution was first and foremost a positive instru-
ment that created a national community and governing powers (and in this 
important regard distinct from the Declaration), and only secondarily a neg-
ative charter of rights that restrained these powers.  Indeed, it should be 
said, the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, only two years after the Consti-
tution came into operation.  The Constitution’s Articles are more “original” 
than its Amendments.  The Federalists believed that federal powers vested 
in a stronger central government, not states’ rights, would more reliably se-
cure the blessings of liberty to us and our posterity. 
To be sure, Hamilton did not win his fight against the need for a Bill of 
Rights, but the point is he made this argument reconciling rights and pow-
ers—and prioritizing powers—well before (and perhaps anticipating the tri-
als of and the run-up to) the Civil War.  Like privacy advocates today, 
Hamilton saw the protection of rights as entirely consistent with the new, 
centralized federalism.  He conceived of the stronger union and federal 
government not as a threat to liberty, but as the single innovation that would 
secure the blessings of liberty to us and our posterity. 
B.  The New, Horizontalist Liberalism 
If modern anti-privacy advocates tend to think of the kind of rights 
protected by privacy as “special rights,” it is because they tend to think of 
rights as claims against government, not against fellow citizens.  They think 
of abortion rights and gay rights as needlessly divisive requests of one part 
of the citizenry upon another.  They do not take seriously the proposition 
that some citizens, especially when they constitute majorities, can oppress 
other citizens.  Privacy advocates, on the other hand, recognize that gov-
ernment is not necessarily always the problem.  They see a new source of 
tyranny when before it came only from kings.  For them, rights are more 
than restraints against government; they are also trumps against democratic 
majorities.  In other words, if anti-privacy advocates practice a verticalist 
liberalism against government from on high, privacy advocates observe a 
horizontalist liberalism against supposed friends on our side when they con-
stitute a tyrannical majority—and this reorientation of liberalism, especially 
difficult in the age of revolutions, was one of Publius’ major innovations 
embedded in the very architecture of the large republic. 
The public/private relationship, which is least as old as the distinction 
Aristotle made between the polis and the oikos, did not really become a 
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“great dichotomy” of western political thought until the early modern era, 
about the time when liberal theorists began to articulate restraints against 
royal/papal authority and the private sphere was reborn and reconceived as 
a zone of autonomy and immunity from state action.34  This was the old, 
verticalist liberalism against kings, relevant at a time when there were still 
kings—understandably, a preoccupation of the First Founders.  The Anti-
Federalists, who analogized the proposed federal government to the King 
(or the King-in-Parliament) betrayed these ancient fears.  But not the Feder-
alists, who did not mistake ancient fears for modern woes.  Publius did not 
automatically assume, as the Anti-Federalists generally did, that the center 
was always corrupt and the periphery always virtuous.  The large republic, 
after all, was intended to neutralize some of the wayward tendencies of 
some in the periphery. 
The First Founders were republican, but they were liberal too.  They 
articulated the rights of Englishmen trampled by George III, as their cousins 
had done against Charles I.  But when the Revolutionary War came to an 
end, the romantic vision of the states as cradles of republican liberty—
where each community was free to design its own constitution and route to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, free from the dictates of either the 
King or a central authority—did not quite come to be.  Those that would 
become Federalists came to appreciate that in slaying the King, they had 
unleashed new woes.  Though peripheralized federalism facilitated plural-
ism and diversity across the states, it was also predicated on a significant 
degree of homogeneity within each state,35 allowing majority factions to 
dominate in the state legislatures.  As Edmund Randolph lamented of his 
home state of Virginia, “the history of the violations of the constitution ex-
tends from the year 1776 to this present time—violations made by formal 
acts of the legislature: every thing has been drawn within the legislative 
vortex.”36  This was the vexing legacy of the First Founding for which the 
Second Founding was the solution. 
Madison and many Federalists shared Randolph’s concern and under-
stood that in the post-Revolutionary Era, Americans had to rethink their un-
derstanding of liberalism.  If old liberals saw kings and central governments 
as the most likely source of tyranny, new liberals (and especially later, New 
Deal liberals) came to appreciate that republics faced a different source of 
tyranny: from our fellow citizens.37  But Madison made the point more tact-
fully than Randolph (and perhaps this is why neo-Federalists and neo-Anti-
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Federalists claim him equally as their own).  Understanding that it would 
have been counterproductive to attack the state legislatures—sacred arti-
facts of the First Founding—to whom the Anti-Federalists were fiercely 
loyal, Madison put the blame instead on the factions that had taken control 
of state legislatures.  He opened Federalist 10, cautiously (even sheepishly), 
saying, “The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions 
on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too 
much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that 
they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and 
expected.”38  With the old oppressors gone, citizens became “much more 
disposed to vex and oppress each other.”39  We must not forget that Publius 
was more than a bewigged Founder; he had an agenda too.  With these 
words, he would construct the critical intellectual bridge from the old, verti-
calist liberalism against kings and the new, horizontalist liberalism against 
arbitrarily powerful groups of citizens (factions) at a time when the memory 
of British rule was still fresh in the minds of most Americans.  We should 
not underestimate how radical this move was just because modern, post-
New Deal liberalism has completed this revolution in thought.  Madison 
was, of course, in Federalist 10, casting aspersions on the league of small 
republics established by the Articles of Confederation when he argued, “a 
pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of 
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit 
of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.”40  His proposed solution to the ef-
fects of faction, an enlarged republic, benefited from the probability that “a 
coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any 
other principles than those of justice and the general good.”41 
In effect, Madison had proffered what others would later elaborate as 
pathologies of the state action doctrine—the problem of factions and major-
ity tyranny meant that it is not just kings or governments that needed to be 
constrained, but arbitrarily powerful groups of citizens, too.42  This concern 
would be eloquently articulated in Federalist 51: “It is of great importance 
in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rul-
ers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other 
part.”43  Those who sing to the virtues of negative liberty in either the Rev-
olutionary Era or modern America seldom take seriously the possibility that 
citizens can be oppressed not only from on high, but by each other.  This 
horizontalist perspective is one that modern liberals share with the delegates 
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at Philadelphia.  When modern liberals invoke privacy against what they 
perceive to be over-zealous legislation by the states, it is because they still 
believe, as Madison had once warned, that majority factions in a state can 
often produce laws that can oppress minorities.  With the King gone and 
democratically elected legislatures in his place, both came to appreciate the 
new potential face of tyranny. 
C.  The New, Heterogenized Republicanism 
When privacy advocates celebrate the right “to be let alone,”—stating 
the case in the negative—they are also affirming the right of individuals to 
make their own decisions and life plans because there are multiple, equally 
valid conceptions of good decisions and no one conception is superior to 
another.44  This plural understanding of the pursuit of happiness could not 
have occurred if Publius had not introduced heterogeneity or diversity—
instantiated both in the large republic and in the separation of powers—as a 
legitimate ingredient of his new, heterogenized republicanism. 
In recognizing the higher probability of citizen-on-citizen, rather than 
king-on-citizen oppression in a republic, the Federalists were not giving up 
on republicanism, but proposing the integration of private and public that 
did not figure in the states-centered classical republicanism of the Anti-
Federalists, or even for some Federalists.  As John Adams wrote, “if a ma-
jority are capable of preferring their own private interest, or that of their 
families, counties, and party, to that of the nation collectively, some provi-
sion must be made in the constitution, in favor of justice, to compel all to 
respect the common right, the public good, the universal law, in preference 
to all private and partial considerations.”45  If what Adams termed “private 
and partial” considerations were once subordinated to public ones in the 
states, as prescribed by classical republicanism, Madison would propose, 
with his new republicanism, that the reconciliation of “private and partial” 
considerations with the “public good” was now an important and legitimate 
goal of the large republic.  To enlarge the sphere, after all, was also an at-
tempt to extend the reach of our empathy and fellow-feeling to individuals 
across state lines.  This, however, was only possible if the Federalists could 
convince the Anti-Federalists that no one state or a majority within a state 
had a monopoly on the meaning of the public good.  Publius understood full 
well that homogeneity, as a virtue in classical and states-centered republi-
canism, had to give way to heterogeneity as an unavoidable reality in a 
large republic; and he tried to reconcile public and private by acknowledg-
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ing both under the neutral banner of “interest.”46  The Anti-Federalists, for 
their part, resisted these innovations because they felt it unrealistic to expect 
citizens to stretch the ambit of their empathies to citizens outside of their 
immediate communities.  They failed to imagine plural routes in the pursuit 
of happiness or that these routes could be accorded equal respect in the 
same republic.  They were, to put things partially, “men of little faith.”47 
If, for the Anti-Federalists, the peripheralized federalism that Ameri-
cans had known from 1776 to 1787 was meant to preserve homogeneity in-
side each state under conditions of heterogeneity across the states (E Uno 
Plures perhaps, as opposed to E Pluribus Unum), Madison reversed these 
priorities in his proposed large republic, which would eradicate the conse-
quences of homogeneity inside each state (majority faction) by encouraging 
heterogeneity across the states.  To modernize republicanism and to make it 
even better than its classical variant, Madison did not subordinate the pri-
vate to the public; instead, he embraced the private as a constitutive part of 
the public.  (In this way, Madison may well have anticipated some of the 
objections to the reification of the public/private distinction and to privacy 
itself by modern theorists.)48  In his disquisition against faction in Federal-
ist 10, Madison wrote, “To secure the public good and private rights against 
the danger . . . faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the 
form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries 
are directed.”49  In Federalist 14, he celebrated the twin pillars of “private 
rights and public happiness.”50  And in Hamilton’s discussion of the separa-
tion of powers in Federalist 51, he was guided by the aim to “divide and ar-
range the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on 
the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over 
the public rights.”51 
The Anti-Federalists’ commitment to homogeneity on the one hand 
and the Federalists to heterogeneity on the other also came attached to two 
different ideal theories of representation that have passed down to our time.  
Since the Anti-Federalists envisioned small homogenous republics, they 
prescribed a mirroring or descriptive theory of representation.  Accurate and 
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responsible representation required a close relationship and similarity in 
values and outlook between the representative and the represented.  Anti-
Federalists like Brutus rejected Madison’s reconceptualization of classical 
republicanism because they feared that the large republic would be “com-
posed of such heterogeneous and discordant principles, as would be con-
stantly contending with each other.”52  Another Anti-Federalist, A Colum-
bia Patriot, scoffed at the “heterogeneous phantom” the Federalists had 
constructed at Philadelphia.53  But that, of course, was precisely Madison’s 
point.  Since the Federalists preferred a large heterogeneous republic which 
necessarily multiplied the geographic (and presumably, ideological) dis-
tance between the center and the periphery, they were committed to a virtu-
al theory of representation that held that a representative physically far from 
and different in outlook from the represented could nevertheless be capable 
of looking out for the interests of the represented.54  Such a representative 
would be able to do so as long as s/he remains neutral with regard to a vari-
ety of different life plans.  This is the theory of representation most con-
sistent with liberal neutrality.55 
The Federalists’ new, heterogenized republicanism is especially evi-
dent in the major institutional output of their “science of politics,”56 the 
separation of powers.  If the fundamental message of the separation of pow-
ers is that no one branch has a monopoly on the people’s will, then the 
complex, separationist architecture of the Constitution indicates the Feder-
alist stay on the old, homogenized republican belief that the common good 
exists as a single veritable reality that precedes the Newtonian interaction of 
the branches.  Until such interaction and jostling occurs to produce a con-
sensual statement of the popular will, the Constitution renders any unilateral 
(or factious) attempt to speak on behalf of the people, whether by a presi-
dent, a senator, or a member of Congress, presumptively invalid.  In this, 
Madison’s new science rejected the ancient techniques of divination exer-
cised by either kings or demagogues, and posited that the only truth (of the 
popular will) that republican governments can come to know is the truth 
that emerges after the people’s different representatives have each presented 
their equally valid versions of it.  In this dynamic approach to the truth 
might, arguably, be found the seed of what would come to be known, in the 
twentieth century, as pluralism—which is just what privacy, at bottom, fos-
ters.  Unlike the Anti-Federalists, who jealously guarded the full and unmit-
igated sovereignty of the states to ward off the consequences of excessive 
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diversity within their boundaries, Madison embraced, and even celebrated, 
heterogeneity as a fact of life in a large republic. 
This also entailed a new understanding of the commonweal and its 
composition.  The Federalists’ common good was not conceived, as the old 
republicans held it, by an abnegation of what were once thought to be un-
clean thoughts, but by a common good forged by encouraging 
“[a]mbition . . . to counteract ambition.”  It is noteworthy that this aggres-
sive language in Federalist 51 conjures the image of wolves (only inadvert-
ently) guarding the sheep, not a harmonious pride of lions looking out for 
each other and the cubs.57  Whereas the old, homogenized republicanism 
emphasized civic harmony, or homonoia,58 Madison’s new, heterogenized 
republicanism acknowledged the possibility of dissensus and to some de-
gree even encouraged it.  Indeed, nearly everything was fair play as poten-
tial input into the Constitution’s machinery—even the vice considered most 
inimical to classical republicanism, ambition.  This was a very different, 
agonistic, view of the ideal polity from the one inherited from antiquity and 
espoused by the Anti-Federalists; it was a dramatic overhaul of republican-
ism.  Consider, for example, the opposing, conservative view implicit in 
Centinel’s question, “If the administrators of every government are actuated 
by views of private interest and ambition, how is the welfare and happiness 
of the community to be the result of such jarring adverse interests?”59  As 
Gordon Wood noted of the First Founders: 
[T]he . . . individual rights so much talked of in 1776 were gener-
ally regarded as defenses designed to protect a united people 
against their rulers and not as devise intended to set off parts of 
the people against the majority.  Few Whigs in 1776 were yet 
theoretically prepared to repudiate the belief in the corporate wel-
fare as the goal of politics or to accept divisiveness and selfish-
ness as the normative behavior of men.60 
If the First Founders and the Anti-Federalists expected virtuous indi-
viduals to submit their wills for the corporate welfare, Madison’s new re-
publicanism posited that the commonweal emerged not from the subversion 
of particular to general wills, but the interplay of all wills, even ambitious 
and selfish ones, within the institutional matrix of the new science.  If Mad-
ison considered even ambition as a worthy input into the constitutional ma-
chinery in an era that disparaged it, then the private is no longer illegitimate 
but a necessary piece of the commonweal.  Madison made it possible for 
contemporary liberals to argue that private thoughts are not ipso facto in-
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admissible into the deliberative sphere.  As Corey Brettschneider has ar-
gued in his re-reading of Rawls, “private life is not a priori distinct from or 
‘protected’ from the political.  Rights and privacy are grounded rather in the 
politics of mutual justification among citizens.”61  In presuming the equal 
validity of all preferences—public or private, selfish or selfless—Madison 
was reimagining, as Isaac Newton did for physics and Adam Smith did for 
economics, the role played by individuals and the way in which they inter-
acted with and collectively came to constitute their communities. 
Like the newly republican Federalists, and unlike the classically repub-
lican Anti-Federalists, privacy advocates contend that privacy is a necessary 
condition for liberty.62  One reason why they believe that privacy fosters 
liberty is that it is a bulwark against any monolithic imposition of moral and 
social values on the individual, and instead embraces heterogeneity and plu-
ralism as necessary parameters for a vibrant society.  The impetus for this 
view came first from the Federalists’ reconfiguration of republicanism.  If 
moderns see privacy as fostering pluralism, the Second Founders presaged 
it by embracing heterogeneity as a necessary virtue in a large republic.  The 
Federalists’ deliberate reshuffling of the binaries inherited from antiquity—
federal/nation, tyranny from kings/tyranny from majority, homogenei-
ty/heterogeneity, and so forth—made the new science of the Second Found-
ing a dramatic advance on the old religion of the First Founding.  In reimag-
ining these binaries, Publius paved the way for the merging of national and 
state interests by the Progressives and liberals of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries. 
IV.  PRIVACY AS A NEO-FEDERALIST PRINCIPLE 
The United States encounters a double conundrum when considering 
privacy, one general and one more specific: where the line is between the 
public and private, and where the line is between the states’ public and the 
national public.  The lion’s share of the debate in the United States has fix-
ated on the latter, and that is why it is so important to recall the Federalists’ 
position as our Second, but not our First Founders.  Just as an appreciation 
of the original federalism, liberalism, and republicanism is critical for un-
derstanding the resistance to privacy, it is important to grasp the distinctly 
new versions of these ideas that have become the constitutional grounds for 
it.  Privacy is unwelcome constitutional furniture for some modern con-
servatives in part because it represented an incursion into states’ rights, a 
subversion of their traditional understanding of liberalism against kings, 
and of homogenized republicanism. 
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Modern conservatives are actually closer in intellectual heritage to the 
First, rather than the Second Founders.  They do not think that it is up to 
federal judges, reading powers allegedly implicit in the federal Constitution, 
to tell state legislatures what they can or cannot do.  They are insistent that 
it is more important to guard against oppression from government than op-
pression from citizens—the latter they understand as a contradiction in 
terms.  They contend that while it is important to maintain community 
standards of morality, it is foolhardy to affirm a national standard that also 
tries to reconcile every point of view.  They are old federalists, old republi-
cans, and old liberals.  As one amongst them, M. E. Bradford put it, “there 
is theory in the private history of free Americans living privately in commu-
nities, within the ambit of family and friends: living under the eye of 
God.”63  This is an Anti-Federalist understanding of privacy: one lived not 
as an individual but as a member of a small community.  Though the Sec-
ond Founding has formally displaced the First, old habits die hard. 
But we should not adopt an Anti-Federalized understanding of the 
Constitution just because Publius said what he needed to say and did he 
needed to do to assure the Anti-Federalists that they were not substantially 
overhauling the principles of the First Founding.  But of course he was; 
otherwise the maneuverings and machinations—and both were necessary—
at Philadelphia would have been all for naught.  The Federalists knew that 
jealousy between the states had created all sorts of problems for the Con-
federation; but they also knew that the Anti-Federalists were not about to 
give up on peripheralized federalism, verticalist liberalism, and homoge-
nous republicanism without a fight.  And so, while the purest expression of 
state sovereignty—the requirement of unanimity for any amendment to the 
Articles of Confederation—was notably set aside in favor of the superma-
jority rule of 9/13 in Article 5 of the new Constitution, the principle of state 
sovereignty was recognized in the make-up of the Senate, in Articles 5 and 
7, and later in the Bill of Rights and especially in the capaciously worded 
Tenth Amendment.64  These provisions would have ramifications deep into 
the nineteenth and even into the twentieth century.65  But we should not 
mistake the Federalists for the Anti-Federalists, the former’s compromises 
with their convictions.  Rather than see the centralized federalism of the 
New Deal and the Great Society as aberrations to “founding” intent, one 
could just as plausibly argue that the delay was caused by these elements of 
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the First Founding grafted on the Second.  Together, they served to en-
trench the imposing police powers of the state governments regulating such 
matters as immigration, morality, public health, and marriage, under which 
any nascent notion of the individual or privacy was suffocated for at least 
another century and a half.  The commitment to the collective welfare of 
citizens within each state, according to William Novak, meant that individ-
ual rights could not trump community interests—this was of course most 
acutely exemplified in the resistance to abolition and afterward with Jim 
Crow.66  Indeed, as scholars since Tocqueville have observed, because the 
Constitution enumerated the powers of the federal government while leav-
ing those of the state governments virtually unlimited in the Tenth Amend-
ment, the Federalist concession to the Anti-Federalists precipitated a unique 
institutional matrix of governance in the nineteenth century comprising the 
state governments and civil and voluntary associations, or what Eldon Ei-
senach has called “parastate” institutions, playing a key role in public ad-
ministration.67  Before the advent of the federal administrative state, in the 
context of what Stephen Skowronek has called the “state of courts and par-
ties,” individual rights were always conceived of and protected under the 
auspices of state and local authorities and civic associations.68  All of this, 
arguably, came about in spite of, not because of, the Federalist persuasion. 
Once we understand that Publius inaugurated a Second Founding, a 
case can be made that privacy advocates are not only more “originalist” 
than their naysayers have claimed; they are faithful architecturalists.  This 
may be why, while some have found it a challenge to find a right to privacy 
in the “penumbras” and “emanations” of the Bill of Rights, it might be a 
more straightforward thing to find its essence instilled in the main body of 
the Constitution and its structure: in the very nature of a stronger union and 
its government, in the large republic, and in the separation of powers.  If so, 
one of the under-theorized paradoxes of the Second Founding is that in ex-
tending the sphere and creating the biggest public that Americans have ever 
known, Publius also affirmed the most private of all private spheres, the in-
dividual.  And if the modern renaissance of privacy bears a family resem-
blance to the Second Founding’s new federalism, liberalism, and republi-
canism, then privacy is much more than just an imprecise statement of 
negative liberty pulled out of a magic hat or weaved out of post-Civil War 
constitutional cloth.  There is no need to defend the right to abortion, con-
traception, or same-sex marriage under (and only under) the old liberal doc-
trine; and there is no need to defend these rights under cover of night, as if 
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they protected odious practices that could only be grudgingly defended in 
the name of negative liberty.  
Instead, the new federalism, liberalism, and republicanism would af-
ford the modern liberal a more robust, positive set of reasons for defending 
privacy.  Reading the new federalism, liberalism, and republicanism back-
wards, we can say that privacy as a constitutional principle is an affirmation 
of the duty We the People owe to each other to respect the presumptive va-
lidity of each citizens’ choice of life plan; it is a reminder that we remain 
vigilant that majorities do not impose their definitions of a superior lifeplan 
to minorities; and that the Constitution is the highest law of the land that 
consecrates this national compact we have with one another.  Even as we 
mark the fiftieth anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut,69 privacy advo-
cates ought to consider if the principle they champion is as old as the repub-
lic—the new republic forged at the Second Founding, that is.  The Federal-
ists’ modern understanding of nationalized rights (the new federalism), of 
the new face of tyranny (the new liberalism), and of the merits of heteroge-
neity (the new republicanism) were the critical innovations of the Second 
Founding that facilitated the turn to privacy.  The formal introduction of the 
right to privacy in the twentieth century did not overhaul the Constitution; 
rather, it was another step in the direction of “a more perfect Union” first 
envisioned by Publius. 
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